黑格尔对中国哲学思想的理解和评价
9、黑格尔对中国哲学思想的理解和评价
杨子 道藏研究 2015-10-06

在阅读哲学史书的过程中,一种明显的感觉是,西方哲学家对中国哲学的阐述有些粗浅。这可能有两个方面的原因:一个是中国哲学传播工作远远不够。另一个则是在传播过程中文字翻译的原因。每一种文字,都有其独特的魅力,一经翻译成外文,就减少了一层光泽。一种思想,经过一度翻译,会远离其核心一步。而中国的绝大部分经典,都是以文言文形式书写保存的,甚至大量的对于原著的注解,也都是文言文。而西方人阅读中国典籍,还存在双重翻译问题:从文言文到现代文是一层翻译,稍微有些许不专业的人翻译都会出现误译;另一层则是从中文翻译到其它文字,这里面就有字到意不到的翻译局限。实际上,这个问题至今没有解决。
西方著名的哲学家黑格尔对东方哲学包括中国哲学基本上不予认可。他曾认为中国哲学“本不属于我们现在所讲的题材和范围之内……我们所以要提它,只是为了表明何以我们不多讲它”(黑格尔,《哲学演讲录》第一卷〕。他认为中国无哲学,有的只是一些常识性的道德教训,“我们在这里尚找不到哲学知识”,“真正的哲学是自西方开始”。有些西方哲学家则不太同意黑格尔这一观点,比如罗素,他说“关于中国,黑格尔除了知道有它而外毫无所知”(罗素,《西方哲学史》),但客观地说,黑格尔对中国哲学的研究特别是儒家思想的研究,还是下过一番功夫的。而他对中国哲学的点评,也是有代表性的。所以这里以黑格为例,讨论一下中国形而上是如何被西方哲学界点评的,进而说明东西方哲学传播中的语言障碍和误区,以及,中国思想发展史中值得反思的地方。

黑格尔说中国有最完备的国史,但他认为中国古代没有真正意义上的哲学,还处在哲学史前状态。这种说法很显然是失实的,一个几千年的文明古国,没有哲学是难以想像的。但这些怪不得他,但是有他的道理的。我之所以说他有道理,有以下两个原因:
一个原因是中国哲学的传播是有限的,而且存在翻译原因。另一个原因,则是他按照西方的标准来评价东方哲学,这有点象是不同频道的人对话一样,没有可比性的。但不可否认的是,他对东方哲学特别是对中国思想的批评是中肯的,应该引起中国人的重视和反思。以下我从这两个原因进行简单介绍和讨论。
第一,翻译中的误译、误读和误解问题。

我们来看看中国哲学经典《道德经》的翻译,原文语言是简练、优美和高深微妙的。每个有点文言文功底的人,读起来都觉得是一种享受。有哲学功底的人尤其。
“道可道,非常道;名可名,非常名。无,名天地之始;有,名万物之母。常无,欲观其妙;常有,欲观其徼。此两者同出而异名,同谓之玄,玄之又玄,众妙之门。”(老子 《道德经》第一章)
我们再来看看法文版译成德文后的中文转译,这是黑格尔读到并引用的版本:
“那可以理论的(或可以用言语表达的)原始的理性,却是超自然的理性。我们可以给一个名了,但它是不可名言的没有名字,它便是天与地的根源,但有了名字,它便是宇宙的母亲。人们必须没有欲望,才能观察它的庄严性;带着情欲,人们就只能看见它的不完善的状态(它的限度,它的边极)”,“这些(它的完善性和不完善性)只是标志同一泉源的两个方式:而这外泉源可以叫做不可钻入的幽深;这个不可钻入幽深包含着一切事物在它自身”。( 黑格尔《哲学史讲演录》第一卷)
我的天哪,这是什么呀?哈哈。难怪西方对中国哲学理解很困难,这样的翻译,天神也难理解。
再看一段:

“道生一,一生二,二生三,三生万物。万物负阴而抱阳,冲气以为和。人之所恶,惟孤、寡、不毂,而王公以为称。故物或损之而益,或益之而损。”
黑格尔读到的译本意思表达竟然是:
“理性产生了一,一产生了二,二产生了三,三产生了整个世界。宇宙背靠着黑暗的原则,宇宙拥抱着光明的原则,温暖之气是由于谐和造成的(或者说,温暖之气使得它们谐和。人们所畏惧的大都是作孤寡和忍受一切缺陷,而王公反以自称孤寡为荣”( 黑格尔《哲学史讲演录》第一卷)

老实说,不要说西方人,就是中国的哲学专业人士如果读到的是这样的文字也很难理解的。所以翻译者又很好心地对以上译文进行了注释:“他们是孤寡由他们不知道事物的原始和他们自己的原始。因此事物的成长在于牺牲对方(这又被翻译成‘世界灵魂’);较好是这样,‘它们增长由于减少,反之它减少由于增加’-----这也是说得很笨拙的。”( 黑格尔《哲学史讲演录》第一卷)
天哪,这是我们的《道德经》吗?这是什么呀?第一次读到,我惊愕不已,然后差点笑晕。蹩脚的翻译不是传播文化,简直是暴殄天物。反复阅读和揣摩这些译文,不得不承认,我不再为中国形而上觉得委屈。从以上段落中的“道生一”中对“道”字翻译来看,在这种反复转移的各个环节中,应该是道学家(又称为理学家,其实是儒家学者中哲学家)在其中一个或多个环节起了作用,于是才有了把这里“道”译成了“理性”。其实道家哲学中的“道”含义很多,单在“道生一”这句话中,指是的宇宙发生论中的源头和法则,是指一个总体的“一”,不可分,也无可分,而《易传》及理学中的“道”则指的是“多”,而且必须是“多”,正是因为有不同的“理”,才生成不同的万物。在理学形而上中,“道”翻译成“理性”是合适的,但在此处,翻译成“理性”则是对“道”的误解,也是对“理”的误解。我于是开始理解西方社会对中国思想领域的知之甚少甚至误读误解。连黑格尔这样的哲学大家对中国思想的解读如此,何况其他。

而这种现象的出现,我们不能怪任何一个现代西方哲学家,更不能怪中国的古代哲学家。中文的博大精深是这种文字最大的魅力,但也造就了学习和传播上的难度。很多情况下,中国人都理解,“只可意会,不可言传”,那么作为外国研究学者,特别是不长期生活在中国的学者,更不可能意会字里行间的那种玄妙了。文言文的精炼和高深难度暂且不提,就是以现代文表达的意思,译成外文也会各不相同。以下我举一个例子来说明中文的含蓄和博广。这是一个民间流传的段子,说中国孩子考托福到国外留学,深受文化差异之苦,于是拿了一篇中国小学生都完全读得懂的文字给一位汉学专业的外国教授看,然后回答问题,这段文字是这样的:

《意思》
小王拿着一个礼物走进领导的办公室。
领导说:“你这是什么意思?”
小王说:“没什么意思,只是一点小意思,不成意思啊。”
领导说:“我懂你意思,只是你这样就没意思了。”
小王说:“真没别的意思,就是意思意思。”
领导说:“这怎么能好意思呢?”
小王说:“您再推辞,我都不好意思了。”
领导接过礼物说:“你这人还真有意思。”
请问:文中13个“意思”都是什么意思?
据说,教授当场晕了。
另一个典型的例子,就是百度公司到美国IPO,他们要说明自已在中文搜索方面比美国搜索引擎google更专业更有优势,就举了一个例子来说明中文表达的复杂性,他们说“我”这个字,在中文中就有“吾、余、愚人、在下、不才、孤、寡人、本座、洒家、哀家、咱家、妾身、贫僧、贫尼......”等三十多种表达,据说美国人投资者立即被说服了。
中文的复杂性,可见一斑。所以,中国人要理解西方世界对中国文化的误读和误解,特别是学术界,包容和大度是一个民族和文化强大的特征。
第二,西式评判标准和切中要害的批评。
黑格尔对中国哲学的评价有道理的另一个原因是他对东方哲学的剖析和批评是深刻的,也是合乎逻辑的,特别是对中国哲学思想的批评,触及到中华民族的软肋---思想不自由,这应该值得每一个中国人去反思。

首先,黑格尔认为哲学不是零碎知识的堆积,哲学是一个发展着的整体。哲学就是哲学史,而“思想的自由是哲学和哲学史起始的条件”,他认为“思想必须独立,必须达到自由的存在,必须 从自然事物里摆脱出来,并且必须从感性直观里超拔出来。思想即是自由的,则它必须深入自身,因而达到自由的意识”。基于这一理论,他认为“东方及东方的哲学不属于哲学史”。在黑格尔及至西方社会的逻辑里,“如果一个民族有了一个合乎正义的法律,则它的对象便是有普遍性的;这又是以精神的坚强为前提。当它以普遍性为意志的对象时,则它便开始了自由”,也就是说,一个民族的法律如果是正义的,那么法律的对象应该是普遍性的,法律应该对每一个人,并且无论是法律的制定者还是其他民众都有独立的意志,于是这种法律才是公正正义的,这种法律保护下的意志才是独立的、自由的。黑格尔这一观点对中国的历史和现实都是有意义的。在宗法时代的中国,一直有“礼不下庶人,刑不上大夫”之说,这样的法律何谈公正性和普遍性?没有公正,所谓的正义也只是个伪命题。没有正义法律的保护,普遍性也是不存在的,个体的意志何谈自由?以儒家思想主导的社会里,个人的思想和意志都是受纲常伦理限制的。所以黑格尔说:

“意志有限性是东方人的性格,因为他们意志活动是被认作有限的,尚没有认识到意志的普遍性。在东方,只有主人与奴隶的关系,这是专制的阶段。在这个阶段里,恐惧一般地是主要的范畴。意志还没有从这种有限性里解放出来,因为思维本身也还不是自由的;因此意志可被认作是有限的,而有限的就可被假定为否定的。这种否定之感———感觉着某种东西不能长久支持下去———就是恐惧。反之自由却不是有限的,而是独立自在的,而独立自在的东西是不能被打倒的。人或是在恐惧中,或是由恐怖来统治人;二者是处在同一阶段。这一差别只在于一方有了较坚强有力的意志,它能够走向前去奴役一个有限的意志使成为一个特殊的目的而牺牲。”( 黑格尔《哲学史讲演录》第一卷)

我们来看一下黑格尔对东方思想的批评逻辑,虽然他说得有点逻辑混乱,前后重复,但意思还是清晰的:
意志有限→思想奴化→思维不自由→意志被否定→恐惧(安全感缺失)→缺少自信→容易被打倒→寻求安全感→被统治而意志受限(去统治并限制民众的意志)。这是一个循环逻辑。
在这个逻辑中,一个核心的问题是“恐惧”,我理解为是心理安全感缺失,管理层之所以要统治和限制民众的思想,是因为缺少心理安全感,而民众之所以甘心被奴役,也是为了寻求安全感。黑格尔的这一逻辑分析,真是击中了东方民族思想的最大软肋,真心期望我们的国民和管理者,不要恼羞成怒,静下心来反思,是不是这么个逻辑,我们是不是就是这么一个缺少自由意志的民族?
这里不免想起一个问题,近两年的中国,在国家改革推进过程中,有一个新的提法,那就是“以法治国”,让人不免去思考,难道以前不是“以法治国?”这个问题不用多思考,很显然,确实不是。不但不是,而且法律也不是全民遵守的法律,在某种程度上,法律是一部分人对另一部分人的形成约束的工具。20世纪90年代初期,曾有过“以德治国”的提法,但却忽略了一个事实,法律是道德的底线,如果法律都不能公平公正,那么道德就没有底线,道德没有底线,要以德治国,是非常危险的。二十年过去了,“法治”没有进化成“德治”,却成了“人治”,造成种种社会底线问题。于是现在又不得不把“以法治国”当成一项改革,中国目前的改革敢于如此自剖自解,无疑是一种勇气,更是一种底气。未来中国民众真的有“意志独立、自由”那一天,那才是真正的国家实力。

黑格尔对中国哲学的点评,主要分为三个部分:孔子、《易经》、道家。

先说他对道家的点评。如前面我引述的黑格尔读到的《道德经》译文,我认为黑格尔并没有真正领会《道德经》的确切含义(这当然不是他的水平问题,而是翻译的原因),而在他在评论中,把道家和道教也当成一回事了。这说明道家及道教文化的传播还任重道远。总体看,黑格尔还认为道家哲学还算是相对自由的哲学,因为道家“属于这一派的人大都不是官员,与国家宗教没有联系”。
对于道的形而上特征,老子说:
“视之不见,名曰‘夷’;听之不闻,名曰‘希’;搏之不得,名曰‘微’。---是谓无状之状,无物之象,是谓‘惚恍’。迎之不见其乎,随之不见其后。”(《道德经》第十四章)
老子对道的无形无状、无声无名的形而上特征描述非常详细了。黑格尔倒是抓住了几个关键词“夷”、“希”、“微”,但很可惜的是他依旧没理解中国的形而上。他引用雷缪萨的观点说“夷、希、微”在中文中没有意义,但组合起来称为“I-hi-wei”(很显然这是音译),简称为“IHW”,这几个就是外来词。由于雷缪萨曾说过他从这三个字的音中发现了耶和华(Jehowah)这个字,于是黑格尔就把“夷、希、微”拉到了全球神学概念大联想中去说明了,他解释说这三个万能词也出现在希腊的“Iαω”里,在非洲人的“尤巴”里,在希伯来文叫做“耶和华”,而罗马人又叫做“约维斯”等等,进行了一番无厘头的“说文解字”,以至于他自己也觉得“对这些符号加以博学的假定是多余的”。

于是他又从哲学的层面进行了一番剖析。总算明白了“天下万物生于有,有生于物”是什么意思,如果黑格尔从纯形而上的角度来看待老子的这一宇宙生成论,就基本到位了,算是走在了中国形而上的大道上了。但他又拿出了自己的分析工具出来了----逻辑分析,使得这一理解又钻入了逻辑的小胡同。这个就使得他的思想又背离道的本质。

黑格尔认为中国没有哲学的主要原因是源于对孔子思想的分析。很显然,由于传播广泛,他对孔子的思想了解相当多。不仅是黑格尔,恐怕是整个西方世界乃至东方世界包括中国,知道孔子的人要比知道老子的人要多,不少人提起中国文化思想就只想到孔子和儒家思想,很少会先想到老子及道家思想。这是一个普遍事实,也不能算是西方世界对中国文化的误解。这一点,每一个因本位利益而过度尊儒抑道的君王和学者都是有历史责任的。
黑格尔给孔子思想的定位是“道德哲学”,这个倒是比较贴切的,其实如果从孔子的核心思想去看,更合适的应该是“伦理学”。给孔子的思想定位成“哲学”,是对孔子的捧杀,也是把儒家思想架上了火堆。因为一旦给定位到哲学层面后,如果按照哲学的境界来分析,孔子的思想就有些捉襟见肘了。黑格尔对孔子和儒家思想的整体比较负面,他说:
“我们看到孔子和他的弟子们的谈话(《论语》),里面所讲的是一种常识道德,这种常识道德我们在哪里都找得到,在哪一个民族里都找得到,可能还要好些,这是毫无出色之点的东西。孔子只是一个实际的世间智者,在他那里思辨的哲学是一点也没有了----只有一些善良的、老练的、道德的教训,从里面我们不能获得什么特殊的东西。西塞罗留下给我们的《政治义务论》便是一本道德教训的书,比孔子所有的书内容丰富,而且更好。我们根据他的原著可以断言:为了保持孔子的名声,假使他的书从来不曾有过翻译,那倒是更好的事”。( 黑格尔《哲学史讲演录》第一卷)

中国有句古语说:“宁有求全之毁,不可有过情之誉”,用这句话来形容孔子种种景遇是再合适不过了。这是一段令所有儒家思想信奉者吐血的点评。但却是中肯的。估计有些偏激的儒士看了也许想发疯到去挖黑格尔的祖坟。但若真那样没有格局,只能说,是井底之蛙。如果不服气,早就该如实端出本民族更令人折服的思想传播出去,而不是一种让黑格尔们认为“不能从中获得什么特殊的东西”的思想。近些年来,不止一个西方国家关闭了象征中国思想文化的“孔子学院”,不仅仅全是政治原因,儒家思想本身存在的问题也是值得我们反思的。
黑格尔对孔子思想评价不高的原因还有两个:一个是他认为孔子的思想并不是自己的原创,他说:“孔子的道德教训所包含的义务都是古代就已经说出来的,孔子不过加以综合”。另一个原因则是孔子思想的普及是官方的强制性推广,并不是与其他思想一样受到同等的对待,民众没有选择哲学信仰的自由。他认为孔子思想所宣传的“只是臣对君的义务,子对父的义务以及兄弟姊妹间的义务”,他又说:
“当中国人如此重视的义务得到实践时,这种义务的实践只是形式的,不是自由的内心的情感,不是主观的自由。所以学者们也受皇帝的命令的支配。凡是要想当士大夫、作国家官吏的人,必须研究孔子的哲学而且必须经过各种各样的考试。这样,孔子的哲学就是国家哲学,构成中国人教育、文化和实际活动的基础。”

黑格尔这些观点是中切的,是正确的。指出了中国思想界中的媚权派,特别是宗法时代的遵从儒教的哲学家及新中国成立后铺天盖地的一色的马列主义学者们,没有自由的灵魂,没有各家思想的共同繁荣,只是一个声音说话,一个思维思考,是中国在近现代发展史上落后于西方的最根本的原因。钱穆先生说:“西方思想如一盏名灯,一灯灭,屋子漆黑;中国思想如多盏小灯,一灯灭了,其他的照亮”,依三百年来东西方思想传播的实际情况看,反过来说才是。从中国哲学思想在国内外的宣传来看,孔子或儒家思想这盏灯才是一股独大的垄断。民众思想的不自由,是一切不自由的根源所在。哪一位国家领导者若能放下自己短暂任期的利益,彻底放开对民众思想的控制,使这个民族不再跪着思考,那中华民族的强大指日可待,那必是中华文明史上最伟大的人,也是世界文明史上的不朽的伟人。对于那个人的出现,这个思想带着枷锁的民族,已等了五千年。
黑格尔这段话还有值得一提的一句是,“这样孔子哲学也就是国家哲学”,这对于很多自我否定没有信仰的中国人来说,是值得思考的。黑格尔没有说国家哲学就是国家信仰,但其潜台词里包含了这一层意思。很多中国的学者,都没有意识到这一点。认为信仰只是宗教的。如果自己没有皈依到哪一家宗教,那就是没有信仰。甚至有些学者甚至不认为中国有自己的宗教,比如钱穆先生,他说:“中国没有自创的宗教而爱讲‘道’,中国没有现代西方那一套完整的科学而爱讲‘理’”(钱穆,《中国思想通俗讲话》),看到他这个观点,真的想替钱穆先生这样的唯儒至上的学者找个地缝钻,中国没有自创的宗教,那道教是什么呢?

黑格尔对中国哲学的研究还集中在《易经》一书。从他对《易经》的点评来看,是比对《道德经》的理解要深一些,但还不能算是真正懂了《易经》的精髓。在黑格尔看来,《易经》的符号算是符合了西方的抽象的思想和纯粹的范畴。他说:“那些图形的意义是极抽象的范畴,是最纯粹的理智规定。”,他终于很不情愿地承认“中国人不仅停留在感性的或象征的阶段”,但他马上强调说:
“我们必须注意--他们(指中国人)也达到了对于纯粹的意识,但并不深入,只停留在最浅薄的思想里面。这些规定诚然也是具体的,但这种具体没有概念化,没有被思辨地思考,而只是从通常的观念中取来,按照直观的形式和通常感觉的形式表现出来的。因此在这一套具体原则中,找不到于自然力量或精神力量有意义的认识。”( 黑格尔《哲学史讲演录》第一卷)

黑格尔这一段话足以说明他对易经思想的不理解甚至是误解。而认为中国哲学没有“思辨地思考”,说明他除了儒家思想之外对中国哲学真是知道得太少了,少得可怜。如果他读过名家和墨家的思辨哲学,相信他的《小逻辑》会写得更精彩。
通过对乾、兑、离、震、巽、坎、艮、坤这八个基础卦象的简单名词介绍,黑格尔无法分析出这被中国人奉若神灵的先天文化,于是他直接得出结论:
“所以他们(指中国人)是从思想开始,然后流入空虚,而哲学也同样沦于空虚”。
接着他用逻辑来进行西式分析,认为从《易经》符号的意义里,从抽象过度到物质是如何的迅速,在卦象里已经进到完全感性的对象。因为“没有一个欧洲人会想到把抽象的东西放在这样接近感性的对象里”,这才是他否定中国哲学的真正原因。因为没有欧洲人这么做过,中国人这么做他就无法理解和认可。

黑格尔的这一判断逻辑虽然很武断和本位主义,但我相信用西方思维对东方文化进行错位评判的人应该不止他一个。这已不是翻译或误解的问题了,而是西方人的自大和唯我独尊心态所致。这是一种偏见,也是一种短见,是一种无知,也是缺少包容的思想。如果霍比特人以自己的身高标准去丈量其他人种的身高,那么所有其他人种都是不符合标准的。我们可以看到不少学科的书中,对西方文明的无条件膜拜和靠拢。从科学的现实看,我倒是可以理解的。但从宗教和哲学层面上,就显得荒唐。比如冯友兰先生在用西方的哲学来解释中国哲学时,谈到公孙龙的“白”的概念与柏拉图的“共相概念”相似时,曾有表述:“看来公孙龙已经有一些柏拉图式的观念”(冯友兰,《中国哲学简史》)这句话怎么读怎么觉得哪里不对劲。虽然从生卒年月上看,公孙龙确实在柏拉图之后,但我们完全有理由和证据说公孙龙的思想与柏拉图并不相干。世界文明中,很多东西是可以模仿的,唯独思想不能。形而上文化的价值和意义就是独特性。印度的国父甘地曾说:“我之所以抵制西方文明,实在是因为它代表不加选择或毫不考虑地模仿他人,好像亚洲人只适合抄袭来自西方的一切事物。”(莫卡 甘地,(甘地自传》)。这里我愿意与西方的黑格尔们真诚地共勉几句话:

自卑和自大,都是一种无知。我们自卑,因为我们不知自己有多优秀;我们自大,因为我们不知道别人有多优秀。所以,真正的强大,不是自卑,也不是自大。而是一种自信,更是一种理解和包容。在宇宙的无限时空内,万物齐等,没有哪一个物种更高明,眼下的幸运和苦难都是阶段性的。据说,蚂蚁和恐龙是同时代的物种,强大的恐龙只剩下化石,渺小的蚂蚁至今遍布人类生存的每一个大洲。
《易经》之外,黑格尔对中国形而上的研究还涉及到《书经》,对于《洪范》里的五行的概念,他认为“这些东西我们不能认为是原则。中国人普遍的抽象于是继续变成为具体的东西,虽然这只是符合一种外在的次序,并没有包含任何有意义的东西。”同时他也认为“对八卦的解释里表示出一种对自然事物加以分类的努力,使这种分类的方式是不适合我们的。中国人的基本质料还远不如恩培多克勒的元素---风、火、水、土。”,如果黑格尔是上帝的话,那么中国人费了两千多年多的努力建立起来的阴阳五行的哲学体系就没有任何的意义了。但事实是,他不是上帝。

然而,他对《书经》里把一切人为活动与对应到自然的五行提出了批评,认为“这些对象显然没有包含有任何令思想感兴趣的东西。这些概念不是从直接视察自然得来的。在这些概念的罗列里我们找不到经过思想的必然性证明了的原则”。对于这一点,我是同意的。儒家对于五行的发挥真是达到了一种艺术程度,金木水火土可以与仁义理智信对应,确实非常牵强的。但实际情况是,那看似思想枯竭的生拉硬扯式联系,是儒家思想的无奈,更是其智慧。儒家思想之所以在几千年的中国处于是国教的地位,是因为这一思想赋予君主无上的权力和威严,对民众思想的愚忠和奴化更是加强了历代君王对儒家思想的依赖。那么,谁来管理这无上的君主呢?在没有上帝的中国,只有靠未知的自然力量(即天和地)去约束君主。中国人称天为父,称地为母,君王被称为天子,代理上天来管理天下。那么能约束帝王的,只有天和地了。于是所有的天象、天灾都可以投射到君王的不良行为中,所以就有了把人的行为与自然的五行进行对应的联系。比如《月令》中是讲君王行为与自然的关系的。这是中国思想界对君王约束和管理的智慧,黑格尔没有读懂这一层含义。现代的中国人接受一点儿西方的教育后,也认为“观天象而谏君王”是一种迷信和对君王的迷惑,这就是不理解儒家和道家那秘而不宣的智慧了。
(本文摘自杨子《中国形而上》2015年10月6日)
Hegel's Understanding and Appraisal of Chinese Philosophy
9. Hegel's Understanding and Appraisal of Chinese Philosophy
By Yang Zi, Daozang Yanjiu, 2015-10-06
In the course of reading the histories of philosophy, one clear feeling: the Western philosophers' accounts of Chinese philosophy are somewhat shallow. There may be two reasons for this. One is that the work of spreading Chinese philosophy has fallen far short. The other lies in the rendering of the texts in the course of that spreading. Every written language has its own peculiar charm, and once it is translated into a foreign tongue it loses a layer of luster. A body of thought, passed through one degree of translation, moves one step away from its core. And the great bulk of China's classics are written and preserved in classical Chinese; even the commentaries on the originals, in great quantity, are classical Chinese too. So the Westerner reading the Chinese canon faces a double translation: from classical Chinese to the modern language is one layer, where even a slightly unprofessional translator turns out misrenderings; the other layer is from Chinese into the other languages, where there is the limit of a translation in which the words arrive but the sense does not. In truth, this problem is unsolved to this day.
The famous Western philosopher Hegel would basically grant no recognition to Eastern philosophy, Chinese philosophy included. He held that Chinese philosophy "does not in fact belong within the subject matter and the scope we speak of here... we mention it only to show why we say little of it" (Hegel, "Lectures on Philosophy," Volume 1). He held that China had no philosophy, only some lessons of commonplace morality: "here we cannot yet find philosophical knowledge"; "true philosophy begins in the West." Some Western philosophers rather disagreed with Hegel on this point--Russell, for instance, who said that "about China, Hegel knew nothing except that it existed" (Russell, "A History of Western Philosophy"). Yet, said fairly, Hegel did put in a stretch of real work on Chinese philosophy, above all on the study of Confucian thought. And his commentary on Chinese philosophy is representative too. So let me take Hegel as the example, to discuss how Chinese metaphysics was judged by the Western philosophical world, and further to show the language obstacles and the blind alleys in the spread of philosophy between East and West, and the points in the history of the development of Chinese thought that deserve reflection.
Hegel said that China has the most complete national histories, but he held that ancient China had no philosophy in the true sense of the term, and still stood in the pre-philosophical stage. The claim is plainly off the facts: that a civilized nation of several thousand years should have no philosophy is hard to imagine. But he cannot be blamed for it--there is reason in what he says. When I say he had his reasons, I mean the following two:
One reason is that the spread of Chinese philosophy has been limited, and there are the causes of translation. The other reason is that he judged Eastern philosophy by Western standards--which is rather like people on different channels talking to each other, with no comparability between them. But what cannot be denied is that his criticism of Eastern philosophy, and of Chinese thought in particular, is to the point, and should draw the attention and reflection of the Chinese. Below I introduce and discuss briefly, from these two reasons.
First, the problem of mistranslation, misreading, and misunderstanding in translation.
Let us look at the translation of the Chinese philosophical classic the Daodejing. The language of the original is concise, beautiful, deep, and subtle. Anyone with a bit of classical Chinese in his bones feels it a pleasure to read--the person with philosophical training especially.
"A Dao that can be spoken is not the constant Dao; a name that can be named is not the constant name. Nothingness names the beginning of heaven and earth; being names the mother of the ten thousand things. In constant nothingness, one observes its mystery; in constant being, one observes its bounds. These two come out together yet differ in name; together they are called the dark; dark upon dark, the gate of all wonders." (Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 1)
Now let us look at the Chinese back-translation of the version that went from the French edition into German--the version Hegel read and quoted:
"The original reason (or primal reason that can be expressed in words) that can be theorized is, however, a supernatural reason. We can give it a name now, but it is unnameable and has no name; it is the root of heaven and earth; but once it has a name, it is the mother of the universe. One must be without desire to observe its solemnity; with passion, one can only see its imperfect state (its limit, its edge)." "These (its perfection and its imperfection) are only two ways of marking the same spring; and this spring may be called an impenetrable deep; this impenetrable deep holds all things within itself." (Hegel, "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," Volume 1)
My heavens, what is this? Ha ha. No wonder the West finds Chinese philosophy hard to understand--translated like this, even a god could not understand it.
One more passage:
"The Dao gives birth to one; one gives birth to two; two gives birth to three; three gives birth to the ten thousand things. The ten thousand things carry the yin on their backs and embrace the yang; the blended qi makes for harmony. What men hate most is to be orphaned, widowed, and unworthy, yet kings and dukes take these as their titles. So a thing is either diminished by being increased, or increased by being diminished."
And what the translation Hegel read expressed was, astonishingly:
"Reason produced the one; the one produced the two; the two produced the three; and the three produced the whole world. The universe leans its back on the principle of darkness, and the universe embraces the principle of light; the warm breath is produced by harmony (or rather, the warm breath brings them into harmony). What men mostly fear is being orphaned and widowed and suffering every defect, yet kings and dukes take pride in calling themselves orphaned and widowed" (Hegel, "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," Volume 1)
To tell the truth, never mind Westerners--even a Chinese professional of philosophy, reading text like this, would find it hard to understand. So the translator, very kindly, added a note to the above: "They are orphaned and widowed because they know neither the origin of things nor their own origin. Hence the growth of things lies in the sacrifice of the other (this was again translated as 'world soul'); better: 'they grow by diminishing, and conversely they diminish by growing'-----this too is very clumsily put." (Hegel, "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," Volume 1)
Heavens--is this our Daodejing? What is this? The first time I read it I was stunned, and then nearly died laughing. A lame translation does not spread a culture; it squanders a treasure of heaven. Reading and pondering these versions over and over, I must admit: I no longer feel aggrieved for Chinese metaphysics. Judging from the translation of the word "Dao" in the "Dao gives birth to one" above, at one or more links of these repeated transfers, a Daoxue scholar (also called a Neo-Confucian, in truth a philosopher among the Confucian scholars) must have had a hand; and so the "Dao" here came to be rendered as "Reason." In fact the "Dao" of Daoist philosophy carries many senses. In the sentence "the Dao gives birth to one" it points to the source and the law in the coming-to-be of the universe: it means a total "one," indivisible, with nothing to divide it into. But the "Dao" of the Yizhuan and of Neo-Confucianism points to the "many," and must be the "many": precisely because there are different "principles," the different ten thousand things are generated. In the metaphysics of the school of principle, translating "Dao" as "Reason" is fitting; but here, to render it "Reason" is to misunderstand the "Dao," and to misunderstand the "principle" as well. And so I began to understand how little the Western world knows of the realm of Chinese thought, even to the point of misreading and misunderstanding it. When a philosophical master like Hegel read Chinese thought like this, what of the others?
But we cannot blame any modern Western philosopher for the appearance of this phenomenon, still less the ancient philosophers of China. The breadth and depth of the Chinese language is its greatest charm, but it is also what makes it hard to learn and to spread. In very many cases the Chinese themselves understand: "it can be grasped in the mind but not conveyed in words"--and then how much less can a foreign research scholar, above all one who does not live long in China, grasp the subtlety between the lines? Leave aside, for now, the concision and deep difficulty of classical Chinese: even the sense of something put in the modern written language, once translated into a foreign tongue, comes out differently in each. Let me give one example to show the reserve and breadth of Chinese. It is a piece current among the people: a Chinese child went abroad to study after the TOEFL, suffered bitterly from the culture gap, and so took a passage that any Chinese primary school student could read perfectly to a foreign professor of Chinese studies, and then asked him questions. The passage went like this:
"Meaning"
Xiao Wang, carrying a gift, walks into the leader's office.
The leader says: "What is the meaning of this?"
Xiao Wang says: "There is no particular intention — just a small token, hardly worth mentioning. [Each phrase uses yisi, 意思.]"
The leader says: "I understand your intention [yisi], but doing this puts me in an awkward position [mei yisi]."
Xiao Wang says: "There is truly no other intention [yisi] — just a little gesture of appreciation [yisi yisi]."
The leader says: "How could I take that with good conscience?"
Xiao Wang says: "If you keep declining, I shall be too embarrassed."
Taking the gift, the leader says: "You really are thoughtful [you yisi]."
Question: the expression yisi (意思) appears thirteen times in the passage--what meaning does each one carry?
It is said the professor fainted on the spot.
Another typical example: when Baidu went to its IPO in the United States and had to show that it was more professional and better placed in Chinese-language search than the American engine google, it gave one example of the complexity of Chinese expression. They said that the single word "wo" (I) has in Chinese thirty-odd expressions--"wu, yu, yu ren, zai xia, bu cai, gu, gua ren, ben zuo, sa jia, ai jia, zan jia, qie shen, pin seng, pin ni..."--and it is said the American investors were convinced on the spot.
The complexity of Chinese is plain from this. So for the Chinese to understand the Western world's misreadings and misunderstandings of Chinese culture--especially in the academic world--tolerance and magnanimity are the mark of a strong nation and a strong culture.
Second, the Western-style standard of judgment, and criticism that strikes home.
The other reason Hegel's appraisal of Chinese philosophy holds water is that his dissection and criticism of Eastern philosophy are deep, and logical as well; his criticism of Chinese philosophical thought in particular touches the soft spot of the Chinese nation--unfree thought--and this deserves the reflection of every Chinese person.
First, Hegel held that philosophy is not a pile of scattered bits of knowledge: philosophy is a developing whole. Philosophy is the history of philosophy, and "the freedom of thought is the condition for the beginning of philosophy and of its history." He held that "thought must be independent, must reach free existence, must free itself from natural things and lift itself out of sensuous intuition. Thought being free, it must go deep into itself, and so reach the consciousness of freedom." On this theory he held that "the Orient and Oriental philosophy do not belong to the history of philosophy." In the logic of Hegel and of Western society, "if a nation has a law in conformity with justice, then its object is universality; and this again presupposes the strength of spirit. When it takes universality as the object of its will, freedom begins." That is: if a nation's law is just, then the law's object should be universal; the law should hold for every person, and both the makers of the law and the rest of the people should have independent wills; only such law is just and righteous, and only the will protected under such law is independent and free. Hegel's view has meaning for China's history and for its reality. In the China of the patriarchal-clan age there was always the saying "rites do not reach down to the common people, punishments do not reach up to the grand masters"--what claim could such law make to justice and universality? Without justice, the so-called righteousness is only a false proposition. Without the protection of just law, universality does not exist either, and how then could the individual's will speak of freedom? In a society led by Confucian thought, the thought and will of the individual were hemmed in by the bonds and codes of ethics. So Hegel said:
"The finitude of will is the character of the Oriental, because his activity of will is taken as finite and has not yet recognized the universality of the will. In the Orient there is only the relation of master and slave; this is the stage of despotism. In this stage, fear is in general the predominating category. The will has not liberated itself from this finitude, because thought itself is not yet free; therefore the will can be taken as finite, and the finite can be presupposed as negative. This feeling of negation--feeling that something cannot hold up for long--is fear. Freedom, on the contrary, is not finite, but independent and self-subsistent, and what is independent and self-subsistent cannot be knocked down. Man is either in fear, or rules over man through terror; the two are at one and the same stage. The difference is only that one side has the stronger will, able to walk forward and enslave a finite will, sacrificing it to some particular end." (Hegel, "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," Volume 1)
Let us look at Hegel's logic of criticism of Eastern thought. Though what he says is a little tangled in logic, repeating itself back and forth, the sense is still clear:
Finite will → thought enslaved → thinking unfree → the will negated → fear (lack of safety) → lack of confidence → easily knocked down → seeking safety → being ruled and the will restricted (or ruling and restricting the people's will). This is a circular logic.
In this logic, one core item is "fear," which I understand as the lack of psychological safety. The managers want to rule and restrict the people's thought because they lack psychological safety; and the people submit to being enslaved also to seek safety. This logical analysis of Hegel's truly strikes the greatest soft spot of the Eastern nations' thought. I sincerely hope that our countrymen and our managers will not fly into a rage at the shame, but will calm down and reflect: is it really this logic? Are we really just such a nation, wanting in free will?
This raises a question one cannot well avoid. In the China of the last two years, in the course of the nation's advancing reforms, there has appeared a new formulation--"governing the nation by law"--and it sets one thinking: was it not "governing the nation by law" before? The question needs little thought: plainly, it was not. Not only was it not; the law was not a law observed by all the people, but to a certain degree a tool by which one part of the people formed a constraint upon another part. In the early 1990s there was the formulation of "governing the nation by virtue," but it overlooked one fact: law is the floor of morality. If the law cannot be fair and just, then morality has no floor; and to govern the nation by virtue when morality has no floor is very dangerous. Twenty years have passed, and "rule of law" has not evolved into "rule of virtue," but into "rule of men," producing all manner of problems at the bottom line of society. So now "governing the nation by law" has had to be taken up again as a reform. That China's present reform dares to dissect itself this way is without doubt a courage, and still more a confidence. The day the Chinese people truly have "independent and free will"--that will be true national strength.
Hegel's commentary on Chinese philosophy falls mainly into three parts: Confucius, the Yijing, and the Daoists.
First, his commentary on the Daoists. From the translation of the Daodejing that Hegel read, as I quoted earlier, I believe he never truly took in the exact sense of the Daodejing (this is of course no problem of his level, but of the translation); and in his commentary he took the Daoist school and Daoism as one and the same thing. This shows that the spreading of Daoist-school and Daoist culture still has a long road ahead. On the whole, Hegel did hold Daoist philosophy to be a relatively free philosophy, because those who "belong to this school are mostly not officials, and have no connection with the state religion."
Of the metaphysical character of the Dao, Laozi said:
"Look for it and it cannot be seen: it is called 'Yi.' Listen for it and it cannot be heard: it is called 'Xi.' Grasp for it and it cannot be got: it is called 'Wei.' -- This is called the shape without shape, the image without thing; it is called 'huhuang.' Meet it and you cannot see its front; follow it and you cannot see its back." (Daodejing, Chapter 14)
Laozi described the formless and shapeless, soundless and nameless metaphysical character of the Dao in full detail. Hegel did seize on the several key words "Yi," "Xi," and "Wei," but alas, he still did not understand Chinese metaphysics. He quoted Rémusat's view that "Yi, Xi, Wei" have no meaning in Chinese but combine into "I-hi-wei" (plainly a transliteration), abbreviated "IHW," and that these are foreign words. Since Rémusat had once said that from the sound of these three characters he had discovered the name Jehovah (Jehowah), Hegel dragged "Yi, Xi, Wei" into a grand free-association across global theology: these three omnipotent terms, he explained, also appear in the Greek "Iao," in the Africans' "Yuba," in Hebrew as "Jehovah," while the Romans called it "Jovis," and so on--a round of utterly gratuitous "character-exegesis", until even he felt that "learned conjectures about these symbols are superfluous."
So he then made a dissection at the philosophical level. At last he understood what "the things of the world are born from being, and being is born from non-being" means. Had Hegel viewed Laozi's cosmogony purely from the metaphysical angle, he would have been basically on the mark, walking the great highroad of Chinese metaphysics. But then he brought out his own instrument of analysis--logical analysis--and the understanding ran into a small alley of logic. And this made his thought turn its back on the essence of the Dao.
The main reason Hegel held that China has no philosophy lies in his analysis of Confucius's thought. Plainly, because it spread so wide, he knew a good deal about Confucius's thought. Not only Hegel: probably the whole Western world, and the Eastern world including China, has more people who know Confucius than people who know Laozi. Many, at the mention of Chinese culture and thought, think only of Confucius and Confucianism, and few think first of Laozi and the Daoist school. This is a general fact, and cannot quite be counted as the Western world's misunderstanding of Chinese culture. On this point, every ruler and scholar who over-honored Confucianism and suppressed the Dao for the sake of sectional interest bears a historical responsibility.
Hegel's positioning of Confucius's thought was "moral philosophy"--which is rather close to apt; in truth, if one looks from the core of Confucius's thought, the more fitting label would be "ethics." To position Confucius's thought as "philosophy" is to kill him with praise, and to hoist Confucian thought onto the bonfire. For once it is positioned at the level of philosophy and analyzed by the standard of philosophy's plane, Confucius's thought shows its bare patches. Hegel's overall view of Confucius and Confucian thought was rather negative. He said:
"We see Confucius and his disciples in conversation (the Lunyu): what is spoken of there is a kind of commonplace morality, one we can find anywhere, among any nation, and perhaps better elsewhere--a thing with nothing outstanding in it. Confucius is only a practical man of worldly wisdom; in him there is not a bit of speculative philosophy--only some good, seasoned, moral lessons, from which we cannot obtain anything special. The book On Political Obligations that Cicero left us is a book of moral lessons, richer in content than all of Confucius's books, and better. From his original texts we may assert: for the keeping of Confucius's reputation, it would have been better had his books never been translated." (Hegel, "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," Volume 1)
An old Chinese saying has it: "rather suffer the blame that demands perfection than accept praise beyond one's due"--no words could better fit Confucius's several fortunes. This is a passage to make every believer in Confucian thought spit blood. Yet it is to the point. I imagine some of the more extreme Confucians, reading it, might be driven mad enough to go dig up Hegel's ancestral graves. But if they really were so narrow-minded as to do that--one can only call it the frog under the well. If they are not convinced, they should long since have honestly brought out this nation's more compelling thought and spread it abroad, rather than a body of thought that leaves the Hegels of the world concluding that "nothing special can be got from it." In recent years, more than one Western country has closed the "Confucius Institutes," the symbols of Chinese thought and culture. That is not entirely politics; the problems inside Confucian thought itself also deserve our reflection.
Hegel's low estimate of Confucius's thought had two further reasons. One: he held that Confucius's thought was not original to him. He said: "The duties contained in Confucius's moral lessons were all spoken out already by the ancients; Confucius merely gathered them together." The other reason is that the spread of Confucius's thought was compulsory promotion by the state; it was not given the same treatment as the other schools of thought, and the people had no freedom to choose their philosophical faith. He held that what Confucius's thought preached was "only the duty of subject to ruler, of son to father, and the duties between brothers and sisters," and he said further:
"When the duties the Chinese set such store by are practiced, the practice of these duties is only formal, not the free feeling of the inner heart, not subjective freedom. Thus the scholars too are subject to the command of the emperor. Whoever would become a scholar-official and an official of the state must study the philosophy of Confucius, and must pass through all manner of examinations. In this way the philosophy of Confucius is the state philosophy, forming the basis of the education, culture, and practical activity of the Chinese."
These judgments of Hegel's are just and correct. They point at the power-wooing faction of China's world of thought--above all the philosophers of the patriarchal age who followed Confucianism, and the all-of-one-color Marxist-Leninist scholars after the founding of New China: no free souls, no shared flourishing of the many schools, one voice speaking, one mind thinking--this is the most root cause of China's falling behind the West in its modern development. Mr. Qian Mu said: "Western thought is like one famous lamp: the lamp goes out and the house is black; Chinese thought is like many small lamps: one goes out and the others still give light." Judged by the actual course of the spread of Eastern and Western thought over three hundred years, it should be said the other way around. Looked at from the publicizing of Chinese philosophical thought at home and abroad, the lamp of Confucius and Confucian thought is precisely the one monopoly grown huge. The unfreedom of the people's thought is the root of all unfreedom. Whatever national leader can set down the interests of his brief term, thoroughly let go of the control over the people's thinking, and let this nation no longer think on its knees--the day that man appears, the strength of the Chinese nation is within sight, and he will be the greatest figure in the history of Chinese civilization and an immortal great man in the history of world civilization. For the appearing of that man, this nation in thought-shackles has already waited five thousand years.
There is one more sentence in this passage of Hegel's worth citing: "In this way the philosophy of Confucius is also the state philosophy." For the many Chinese who dismiss themselves as having no faith, this is worth thinking about. Hegel did not say that a state philosophy is a state faith, but between the lines the meaning carries that layer. Many Chinese scholars have never come to realize this point. They take faith to belong to religion alone: if one has not taken refuge in some religion, then one has no faith. Some scholars even hold that China has no religion of its own--Mr. Qian Mu, for instance, who said: "China has no religion of its own founding, yet loves to speak of the 'Dao'; China has none of that complete modern Western science, yet loves to speak of the 'li'" (Qian Mu, Zhongguo Sixiang Tongsu Jianghua). Reading that view of his, I truly wanted to find a crack in the floor to slip into, on behalf of scholars like Mr. Qian Mu who hold Confucianism supreme. If China has no religion of its own founding, then what is Daoism?
Hegel's study of Chinese philosophy also centered on the book of the Yijing. Judged from his commentary on the Yijing, his understanding is somewhat deeper than of the Daodejing, but it still cannot count as truly grasping the essence of the Yijing. In Hegel's view, the symbols of the Yijing counted as answering to Western abstract thought and pure categories. He said: "The meaning of those figures is of the most abstract categories, the purest determinations of the intellect," and he at last, very unwillingly, conceded "that the Chinese have not remained merely at the sensuous or symbolic stage"; but he insisted at once:
"We must note--they (the Chinese) have also reached a pure consciousness, but not in depth, remaining only in the shallowest thought. These determinations are indeed also concrete, but this concrete is not conceptualized, not speculatively thought; it is taken from ordinary notions and set forth in the form of intuition and of ordinary feeling. Therefore, in this set of concrete principles, one finds no knowledge of meaning in the powers of nature or of spirit." (Hegel, "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," Volume 1)
This one passage of Hegel's is enough to show his non-understanding, even his misunderstanding, of the thought of the Yijing. And his claim that Chinese philosophy has no "speculative thought" shows that, beyond Confucian thought, he simply knew too little of Chinese philosophy--pitifully little. Had he read the speculative philosophy of the School of Names and the Mohists, I believe his "Shorter Logic" would have been written even more brilliantly.
With a bare noun-list of the eight basic trigram images--Qian, Dui, Li, Zhen, Xun, Kan, Gen, Kun--Hegel could not analyze out this pre-heaven culture that the Chinese hold as divine, and so he went straight to the conclusion:
"So they (the Chinese) begin with thought, then pour away into emptiness, and philosophy likewise sinks into emptiness."
Then he used logic to make his Western-style analysis, holding that from the meaning of the symbols of the Yijing, the passage from the abstract over into the material is astonishingly swift, and that in the trigram images one has already advanced to wholly sensuous objects. For "no European would ever think of setting the abstract so close to sensuous objects"--and this is the real reason he negates Chinese philosophy: because no European had ever done so, he can neither understand nor accept that the Chinese did.
This judgment-logic of Hegel's is arbitrary and self-centered, but I believe those who judge Eastern culture out of joint with Western thinking are more than one man. This is no longer a problem of translation or of misunderstanding; it is the arrogance of Westerners and the mind-set of I-alone-am-supreme. It is a prejudice, and a short-sightedness; an ignorance, and a want of tolerant thought. If the hobbits measured the stature of all other peoples by their own height, then every other people on earth would fail to match their standard. In the books of not a few disciplines one can see the unconditional worship of and leaning toward Western civilization. From the reality of science, I can understand it. But on the planes of religion and philosophy, it looks absurd. For instance, when Mr. Feng Youlan was using Western philosophy to explain Chinese philosophy and came to the resemblance between Gongsun Long's concept of "white" and Plato's concept of the "universal," he once wrote: "It seems Gongsun Long already had some Platonic ideas" (Feng Youlan, "A Short History of Chinese Philosophy"). However one reads that sentence, something feels off. True, by the dates of birth and death, Gongsun Long comes after Plato, but we have every reason and every evidence to say that Gongsun Long's thought had nothing to do with Plato's. In the civilizations of the world, many things can be imitated--thought alone cannot. The value and meaning of metaphysical culture is its uniqueness. Gandhi, the father of India, once said: "The reason I resist Western civilization is, in truth, that it represents imitation of others without selection or thought, as if Asians were fit only to copy whatever comes from the West" (M. K. Gandhi, "The Story of My Experiments with Truth"). Here, then, a few sincere words of mutual encouragement with the Hegels of the West:
Self-abasement and arrogance are both a kind of ignorance. We abase ourselves because we do not know how good we are; we grow arrogant because we do not know how good others are. So true strength is neither self-abasement nor arrogance, but a self-confidence--and still more an understanding and an embracing. In the boundless space and time of the universe, all things stand equal: no species is wiser than another, and the luck and the suffering of the moment are each but a phase. It is said that ants and dinosaurs were species of the same age: the mighty dinosaur has left nothing but fossils, while the tiny ant to this day covers every continent where human beings live.
Beyond the Yijing, Hegel's study of Chinese metaphysics also touched the Shujing (Book of Documents). On the concept of the five phases in the Hong Fan, he held that "these things we cannot regard as principles. The Chinese universal abstraction thus goes on to become something concrete, though this only answers to an external order, and contains nothing of meaning." He also held that "the interpretation of the eight trigrams shows an effort to classify the things of nature, but this way of classifying does not suit us. The fundamental matter of the Chinese falls far short of the elements of Empedocles--wind, fire, water, earth." If Hegel were God, then the system of yin-yang and five-phase philosophy that the Chinese built with more than two thousand years of effort would have no meaning at all. But the fact is: he is not God.
Yet he criticized the Shujing for corresponding all human activity to the five phases of nature, holding that "these objects plainly contain nothing that interests thought. These concepts are not drawn from the direct observation of nature. In this stringing-out of concepts we find no principle proven by the necessity of thought." On this point, I agree. The Confucian working-out of the five phases truly reached the level of an art: making metal, wood, water, fire, and earth correspond to benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and faith is indeed very forced. But the fact is that this seemingly thought-bankrupt linking by forced drag was the helplessness of Confucian thought--and its wisdom too. The reason Confucian thought held the position of state creed in China for thousands of years is that this thought vested the monarch with supreme power and majesty, and its fawning enslavement of the people's minds only deepened the reliance of ruler after ruler upon it. Well then--who was to govern this supreme monarch? In a China without God, only the unknown powers of nature (that is, heaven and earth) could constrain the monarch. The Chinese call heaven father and call earth mother, and the monarch is called the Son of Heaven, ruling the realm in heaven's stead. So what could constrain the emperor was heaven and earth alone. Thus every celestial sign and every heaven-sent disaster could be projected onto the monarch's misconduct, and so there arose the correspondence of human conduct with the five phases of nature. The Yue Ling, for instance, treats the relation of the monarch's conduct to nature. This was the Chinese world of thought's wisdom for restraining and managing the monarch; Hegel did not read this layer of meaning. Modern Chinese, after taking on a little Western education, also take "observing the heavens to admonish the ruler" for a superstition and a deluding of the monarch--which is not to understand that unspoken wisdom of the Confucians and the Daoists.
(This article is excerpted from Yang Zi's "Chinese Metaphysics," October 6, 2015)